# 1nc – ada round 2

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#### The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action – they don’t meet

Ericson 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.   
  
**Core laws are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC acts**

**Horton 18**—(Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law), Horton, Thomas J. 3/20/18. University of New Hampshire Law Review. “Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values,” 65.

When Congress passed such **core antitrust legislation** as the **Sherman Act** in 1890, and the **Clayton and FTC Acts** in 1914, it was fully cognizant of and wished to push forward the broad social, political, moral, and economic currents favoring equality of opportunity, fair and ethical competition, and the fear of concentrated power—both political and economic. These core American values predated the American Revolution, and sparked the Boston Tea Party on December 16, 1773—a revolt against the British East India Company’s efforts to monopolize the colonial tea trade. 233

**Expanding requires a reversal of legislative intent**

**Garubo 84** --- Angelo G. Garubo, Senior Vice President and Corporate Secretary, Commercial Credit Group, Juris Doctor, magna cum laude, from California Western School of Law, “Severing the Legislativ ering the Legislative Veto Provision: The Aftermath of Chada vision: The Aftermath of Chada”, California Western law Review, Vol 21 No 1, 1984, https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1559&context=cwlr

Since a veto provision can qualify as a proviso, the rule in Davis v. Wallace 147 and Frost v. Corporation Commission 148 can be applied to show that the legislative intent test is inadequate to determine if a veto provision should be severed. In Davis and Frost, the Supreme Court ruled that a proviso could not be severed if it was originally written into the statute. 149 The Court reasoned that severing such a provision would result in an extension of the scope of the statute.' 50 Such an extension would be contrary to the legislative intent of a statute by **including subject matter** which the **legislature expressly chose to exclude**.151 The Davis and Frost analysis can be applied to the "congressional veto" because (1) the veto provision can be considered a proviso 152 and (2) severing a veto provision will **expand the scope** of the statute **contrary to legislative intent**. 5 3 By severing a veto provision the executive branch would be free to expand or limit the scope of a statute through its implementation. Such an expansion or limitation **would constitute a defacto contradiction of legislative intent** by **altering the purview of the statute**.' 54 A veto provision is a control mechanism.' 55 Its mere presence in a statute indicates the legislature's desire to restrict the scope of that statute. 5 6 **By removing it, the court would affect a fundamental change in the** nature of the **statute**, which was not accounted for when the legislature enacted the law. 157 Because a veto provision is a proviso, its excise from a statute would contradict legislative intent. A test which uses legislative intent to determine if a veto provision is severable could only find that the provision is not severable. Thus, when literally applied, the legislative intent test is not adequate to determine if a veto provision should be severed from its statutory framework.

#### Vote neg – the aff is not a governmental expansion of core antitrust laws

#### Our impact is debatability:

#### Limits – A bounded topic serves as a preset stasis point for debate than ensure thematic coherence. A limitless topic destroys debate’s competitive incentives – guaranteeing a race to the margin distorting topic research

#### Ground. A pre-defined controversy ensures a vibrant lit base and in-depth clash, but it’s unreasonable to prepare for alternative frameworks with the ground allocated to us by the parameters of the resolution. All 2AC defense to this claim will rely on concessionary ground, which isn’t a stable basis for a year of debate.

**The terms of the resolution create a meta-language that offers a rubric for evaluating arguments under a deliberative framework. Discussions outside stasis are a rhetorical tactic straight out of Trump’s pocket—making the topic into a first-order question sidesteps deliberative testing, which breeds dogmatic group polarization and trades argumentation for power**

**Aikin and Talisse 17**—Assistant Professor of Philosophy AND W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy, Professor of Political Science, and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Vanderbilt University (Scott and Robert, “Democracy, Deliberation, And The Owl Of Minerva Problem,” The Critique, January/February 2017, dml)

To see this, consider that so many features of democratic political life **depend for their intelligibility** on the aspirations of **good argumentative culture**. News is no longer simply read, but is presented in a format of pro-and-con panel debate; journalists ask questions about reasons politicians have for policies, and test politicians’ views for internal consistency; public debates are organized prior to elections. These are all in the service of **realizing a deliberative democracy**, a mode of democratic politics where public argument is a (perhaps the) **central** civic activity. Note further that the deliberativist aspiration drives our criticism of what are generally taken to be democratically degenerative forms of political communication. Bias, spin, derp, lying, flip-flopping, glad-handing, and all the rest could hardly be regarded as deserving of political criticism **except against the backdrop** of the **ideals of deliberative democracy**. These terms would not be accusatory were it not presumed that democratic citizens are committed to a politics of **epistemically sound public argumentation**.

Though the deliberativist aspiration is widespread, and arguably constitutive of contemporary democracy, it remains an aspiration. As we all know, public argumentation among democratic citizens is at best a mixed bag. Attempts to deliberativize democracy are **fraught with hazards**. For one thing, democratic citizens tend to discuss politics **mainly with like-minded others**. This occasions the difficulties associated with the phenomenon known as **group polarization**: as like-minded people speak to each other about their shared views, their positions shift towards **more extreme versions**. Put otherwise, under conditions of doxastic homogeneity, deliberation produces extremism. And as one’s views progress towards extremity, one grows **increasingly unable** to countenance the possibility of **reasoned**, **informed**, and **sincere disagreement**. That is, group polarization feeds what Julian Sanchez has described as **epistemic closure**, the incapacity to see views that run counter to one’s own as **even intelligible**. And as one’s views become epistemically closed, one will increasingly find one’s critics to be **incompetent**, **insincere**, **dishonest**, and **ignorant**. Their points will appear as mere noise or petulant emoting. Eventually, one will see fit to simply stop listening to those who espouse opposing views. As a result, there will be progressive **all-around marginalization** of **unorthodox**, **unpopular**, and **unfamiliar political views**. Those already least likely to get a hearing will be increasingly regarded as incapable of intelligible speech. Accordingly, the deliberativists’ central democratic mechanism seems to undermine democracy.

Of course, these difficulties become only more pronounced once it is noticed that public political deliberation is of necessity largely mediated by various modern communicative technologies. No deliberative democrat explicitly calls strictly for face-to-face discussions among citizens; public deliberation must be facilitated by intermediary institutions, such as social media, television news channels, websites, and online forums of many other kinds. Despite the fact that these communication platforms all offer the potential for robust argumentative exchange among citizens who may be geographically and politically distant from one another, in practice, they tend to exacerbate the vices outlined above. A casual survey of the comments thread of nearly any news site will show that polarization, closure, and marginalization are the norm. Well-run argument is beyond scarce on the internet.

The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk. Only after we have identified these pathologies and suffered their consequences can we think about how to mitigate them. There are many fixes on offer among theorists of democracy. Some argue in favor of new and demanding civic duties that require citizens to read widely across the political spectrum. Others propose institutional interventions, ranging from the enactment of “equal time” laws for news outlets and websites, to the creation of a new national holiday devoted to professionally-orchestrated public deliberation events. Empirically-minded theorists of deliberative democracy are working vigilantly on these matters. It is safe to say that there is no easy way to inoculate deliberative democracy against these pathologies. But even if there were, we worry that another, even more foreboding difficulty lurks. There is reason to think that public argument itself, even when institutional distortions do not pervert it, yields its own pathologies.

Consider the following. Some arguments fail because they run on false premises. Other arguments fail because they draw an **obviously unwarranted conclusion** from their premises, much in the manner in which a magician pulls a rabbit out of his hat. In such cases, it isn’t difficult to see that something has gone awry. But some cases of the latter kind of failure aren’t so obviously failures. These are cases of **fallacious argument**. Fallacies are arguments that we tend to regard as good, but in fact are not. We have to **work** to **see them as failures**, and developing the ability to see them as failures requires us to craft concepts with which to diagnose the ways in which they go wrong. This calls us to **theorize arguments**. The task is notoriously difficult, as the proliferation of textbooks and college courses on Critical Thinking suggests. One trouble is that the variety of seemingly good (but in fact bad) arguments is considerably wider than the variety of diagnostic names we have for them. Moreover, this variety is itself **continually moving** and **growing**. Our apparently endlessly creative linguistic capacities occasions a similarly capacious field for the creation of new forms of fallacious argumentation. As a consequence, it is often **only in retrospect** — **after the debates are over**, **votes are cast**, and **decisions are made** — that the illusions can be **revealed for what they are**. And with the proliferation of communication outlets and argumentative forums, argumentation theory can hardly keep up.

One reason why our theories have a hard time keeping up is that our best models of argument take them centrally to be **dialogues**, between **two** people or parties, who **exchange reasons**, each with the purpose of **changing the other’s mind**. But this dyadic (two-sided) model is **no longer fitting**. It leaves out of its purview the fact that argumentative dialogues, especially when occurring by means of modern technological mediation, are performed largely for the sake of onlooking **audiences**. The two discussants may reply to each other, but their objective is actually to **move the audience**. Once we see this **triadic** (three-sided) structure to political argumentation, many otherwise strange phenomena start to **make sense**.

Consider the textbook straw man fallacy. In the case of the straw man, one takes one’s opponent’s view and restates it in a form that is more easily criticizable. One then goes after the new (and worse) version of the view with justly critical lines about it. And then one closes the discussion. For sure, this would not convince the opponent, as they would only say that this criticized version of the view is not their own. But a straw man argument can move an onlooking audience, those who may not be familiar with the issue under debate, who may not be particularly sympathetic with one side, or who may just be looking for a moment of easy clarity with the issue. The straw man strategy gives them what they are looking for.

Consider, further, that much of the textbook vocabulary concerning fallacies has made it into the vernacular. One of particular note is that of the ad hominem, the fallacy of inferring that someone is wrong from the fact that they exhibit some irrelevant personal vice. It is common to find in popular political discourse charges of the ad hominem. To be sure, the prohibitions on name-calling and insulting an interlocutor’s person in the midst of a debate is very old; but now that we have a name for the prohibited strategy, we have a critical tool to invoke in the midst of argument. That the vocabulary of “ad hominem” and “straw man” has entered the political vernacular means that public arguers have additional means with which to sort the good reasons from the bad.

But notice that when the argumentative strategy of invoking a fallacy name is used, it occurs as yet one more move in the developing argumentative exchange. One invokes the straw man or the ad hominem as a way of criticizing one’s interlocutor. So, when Donald **Trump** was criticized in the Republican Primary debates for his use of the ad hominem, he interpreted the criticism simply as **more naysaying** to contend with in the argument; he did not take the criticism to be **targeting his style of engagement**. Three specific examples are of note. The first is when Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) chastised Trump for insulting people for their looks. Trump responded, “I have never attacked Rand Paul on his looks . . . . And believe me, there’s plenty of subject matter there”. The second is when Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) impersonated Trump to open the Iowa debates (Trump was absent). Cruz began: “Let me say that I’m a maniac, and everyone on this stage is stupid, fat, and ugly. And Ben (Carson), you’re a terrible surgeon . . . . And now that we’ve got the Donald Trump portion out of the way . . . . ”. Third and finally, at the very late Texas primary debate, Trump acknowledged the effects his attacks on others, and noted, “So far, I cannot believe how civil it’s been up here”.

What is troubling here is that in these moments the vocabulary for criticizing the mode of argumentation has become **merely one more tactic** in the argument, one more way to discredit another’s views. The **whole point** of developing the diagnostic language of fallacies is to create a vocabulary with which we can **argue about the argument itself**, rather than the **first-order claims** at issue within it. In particular, the Cruz moment is important, because, in accusing Trump of relying on the ad hominem, Cruz is himself attacking Trump, the person. That is, the impersonation of Trump’s ad hominem is itself a form of ad hominem. And so, instead of being a tool for evaluating the mode of the debate, the fallacy-charge falls back into the debate itself; it becomes yet one more tactic internal to the dispute. Trump obviously sees this point very clearly, as he plays with insulting (by not insulting) Rand Paul, and goes out of his way to acknowledge and congratulate himself that he (and the others) haven’t been name-calling in the Texas debate.

We argue in our natural languages, and so often when we argue, we argue over economies, animals, environments, poverty, and so on. But arguments are **structured collections of statements** that are alleged to manifest certain kinds of logical relations; consequently, they, too, can be the subject of scrutiny and disagreement. And often in order to evaluate a claim about, say, poverty, we need to attend specifically to the argument alleged to support it. In order to discuss arguments, as arguments, we must develop a language about the argumentative use of language. That is, we must develop a **metalanguage**. The objective in developing a metalanguage about argument is to enable us to talk about a given argument’s quality **without taking a side in the debate** over the truth of its conclusion. Accordingly, with the metalanguage in place, we can assess the quality of a given argument **without reference to our own view** of the matter under dispute. Among other things, the metalanguage enables us to **criticize the arguments offered** by people with whom we agree, and it similarly allows us to recognize that sometimes **a powerful argument can be produced** for a conclusion that we know is false. But perhaps most importantly, the metalanguage enables certain **crucial self-critical assessments**; it is by means of the metalanguage that we can **assess our arguments as lacking** without thereby adopting a skeptical stance with regard to our own first-order positions. Put more simply, it is by means of the metalanguage about argument that we can **stand above the fray of our first-order disputes**, as it were, and ascend to a relatively impartial plane from which to assess not the matter under dispute, but the dispute itself. One might say that rationality itself depends upon our ability to competently wield a metalanguage about reasoning, debate, and argument.

The problem is that when the concepts of the metalanguage are **used as first-order tools** in an ongoing argument, the impartiality of the metalanguage is **dissolved**. And so **with Trump**, the language of fallacies became for all involved in the debates yet **one more competing view** about which to wrangle. The metalanguage for assessing the mode of dispute was **dragged into the dispute itself**, and, predictably, the rationality of the exchanges **dissolved precipitously**.

The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk. **Only after** the day is done, after the argument is over, are the tools of wisdom available. The tools of argument assessment, when applied **in the midst of the argument**, are **mistaken for**, or are **appropriated as**, yet more **first-order claims**. They are **entered into the breach**, and so **can no longer assess it**. Subsequent debate **flies free** of **evaluative** and rational **constraints**. And what passes for argument then is **mere power**.

**Analogies between limits and violent exclusion are faulty—argumentative exclusion is inevitable, but topicality ensures it occurs around reciprocal lines.**

**Anderson 06**—Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University (Amanda, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, 281-290, dml) \*edits denoted in brackets []

My recent book, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often **trumped**, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural **identity** and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of **ethos**, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a **critique** of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain **unquestioned legitimacy**, one that **cannot** or **should not** be subjected to the challenges of **reason** or **principle**, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, **always** involved in forms of **exclusion**, **power**, or **domination**. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of **respect**, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be **protected from debate**, that argument is somehow **injurious** to persons if it **does not honor** their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities **accepted without challenge**, is **strenuously opposed**. As is the notion that **any** attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of **reason-giving argument** is somehow **necessarily** to impose a **coercive norm**, one that will ~~disable~~ [undermine] the **free expression** and **performance** of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced—if misconceived—criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement—the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of [End Page 281] a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate **reconciling** ourselves to disagreements rather than **arguing them out**, by contrast, there is a **complacent**—and in some versions, even **celebratory**—attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to **justify** their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society.

One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos—specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers—was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.)

The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity—race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of [End Page 282] contingency—recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smith's portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples—and the larger claim they support—are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument.

Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly." This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies—to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference.

More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the [End Page 283] question of disagreement about **what counts as argument**. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a **wide variety** of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist—and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics—that when they have an **effect**, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the **very form of reasoned analysis** that their champions sometimes imagine they must **refuse** in order to liberate other modes of being (the **affective**, the **narrative**, the **performative**, the **nonrational**). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be **affirmed** and **communicated** and also can be used to justify **political positions** and **legislative agendas**.

Robbins claims that I violate my own ideal of dialogue by failing to engage those who, according to him, are "[my] most significant antagonists": Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Rancière. But it is simply not true that I fail to address the fundamental concerns that neither of these thinkers owns in any absolute sense. I might have addressed their work particularly (there are significant differences between them), and I think the example of Rancière is a particularly fruitful one, especially given his own critique of sociological reductionism (and identity politics), and his universalism, which shares affinities with the forms of poststructuralist universalism (notably, Etienne Balibar's) that I address in the third chapter of my book. But the relevant issues of incommensurability of language games or cultural perspectives, and the question of intractable or "hardwired" exclusion, are adduced and repeatedly critiqued throughout the book, across a range of disciplines. The debate between the accommodationist position of Thomas McCarthy and the universalist position of Habermas addresses these issues straight on, and the discussion of Habermas clearly maps out the two main alternatives to his position as (1) incommensurable perspectives and (2) overlapping consensus. The analysis of Satya Mohanty and Martha Nussbaum is also directly relevant: Mohanty situates his project with respect to a well-known and parallel debate in anthropology represented by the opposed positions of Ernest Gellner and Talal Asad. My emphasis on the newer discussions of accommodation, [End Page 284] rather than the incommensurability theorists (e.g., Lyotard), is meant to argue for the Habermasian position against its newer and more interesting challengers, and I also wanted the book to move beyond the parochial reference points of literary and cultural studies to engage relevant work in political theory and political philosophy. And of course I do discuss the work of many influential theorists and literary critics who oppose the approach I take in the book generally. But I'm not going to reproduce my complete range of references: readers are free to decide for themselves how comprehensive and various the theoretical landscape is in my book. But I will say in response to Robbins that my "primary antagonist" considered as a position rather than a set of proper names is consistently present in the book, and taken on in a number of different ways.

There is a deeper issue at play in Robbins's invocation of Lyotard and Rancière, especially given where his discussion of what he calls my "argumentative normativity" ends up. On the one hand, Robbins wants to say that the argument I am taking up is no longer relevant, that "thankfully" literary critics have moved past the critique of Enlightenment. On this account I am sadly unaware that my earlier books have actually had some influence, and seem to be stuck in an agonistic position that has no traction, and that at this point constitutes a regression toward a naively pro-Enlightenment position that is likely to invite—and that at some level deserves to invite—a strong reiteration of the critique of Enlightenment. The moves need to be replayed in slow motion here to discover exactly what is going on, since the argument is quite kinetic, and involves a dubious framing of my own project. It is certainly the case that in diagnosing the state of academic argument in the humanities today, I invoke, as one of the contributing factors, the excesses involved in the critique of Enlightenment. It is not the only factor I invoke, but it is certainly adduced as a major contributing factor to the denigration of reason, critical distance, and formal argument. I do agree with Robbins that there are many critics challenging the critique of Enlightenment. There are also, as it happens, many critics who have walked away from the debate to do other things. But it remains the case, as Robbins's own response makes clear, that the stronger version of the critique has a kind of staying power, particularly as a way of asserting political pedigree in the last instance. Indeed, Robbins must insist that I resurrect a version of the very form of Enlightenment that was once the whipping boy of poststructuralism, in order to himself reintroduce a high-stakes political allegory that will imagine cultural criticism to be an immediate actor in the current international political landscape.

Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting **argument** and **debate**, and promoting **reason-giving practices** as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of **cultural authenticity**, somehow come to be seen as a **dangerous resurgence** of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "**argument on my own terms**"—that [End Page 285] is, I want to **impose reason** on people, which is a form of **power** and **oppression**. But **what can this possibly mean**? Arguments **stand** or **fall** based on whether they are **successful** and **persuasive**, even an argument in favor of argument. It **simply is not the case** that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is **tantamount to oppressive power**. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself **violent**, **inherently**, and that it will **always mask power** and **enforce exclusions**. But to assume this is to assume the **very view of Enlightenment reason** that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is **directly** oppressive, but that what you argue for **would be**, if it were **enforced**." Yet my book **doesn't imagine** or **suggest it is enforceable**; I simply **argue in favor of**, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and **proceduralist framework**. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police.

Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off:

Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an **end** to the arguments they **find most interesting**. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a **guerilla insurrection**, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to **dress in uniform**, reside in **well-demarcated camps** and **capitals** that can be **bombed**, fight by the **rules of states** (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be **assured** of having the **upper hand**.

Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the **sudden elevation of stakes**. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a **grandiose political meaning** to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the **equivalent of war atrocities**. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak [End Page 286] about concerns with voting transparency. It is **hard** for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the **Bush administration** when that administration has exhibited a **flagrant disregard of** democratic **procedure** and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am **not** interested in **imagining** that proceduralism is the **sole political response** to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

There is a way to make Robbins's point more narrowly, which would run something like this: Anderson has a very restricted notion of how argument should play out, or appear, within academic culture, given the heavy emphasis on logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness. This conception of argument is too narrow (and hence authoritarian). To this I would reply simply that logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness **do not exhaust** the possible forms, modes, and strategies of argumentation. There is a **distinction** to be made between the **identification** of moves that **stultify** or disarm **argument**, and an **insistence** on some sort of **single manner** of reasoned argument. The former I am **entirely committed** to; the latter **not at all**, despite the fact that I obviously favor a certain style of argument, and even despite the fact that I am philosophically committed to the claims of the theory of communicative reason. I do address the issue of diverse forms and modes of argument in the first and last chapters of the book (as I discuss above), but it seems that a more direct reflection on the book's own mode of argumentation might have provided the occasion for a fuller treatment of the issues that trouble Robbins.

Different genres within academe have **different conventions**, of course, and we **can** and **do** make decisions **all the time** about what **rises** to the **level of cogency** within specific academic venues, and what **doesn't**. Some of those judgments [End Page 287] have to do with protocols of argument. The book review, for example, is judged according to whether the reviewer responsibly represents the scholarship under discussion, seems to have a good grasp of the body of scholarship it belongs to, and convincingly and fairly points out strengths and weaknesses. The book forum is a bit looser—one expects responsible representation of the scholarship under discussion, but it can be more selectively focused on a key set of issues. And one expects a bit of provocation, in order to make the exchange readable and dramatic. But of course in a forum exchange there is an **implicit norm** of argument, a tendency to **judge** whether a particular participant is making a **strong** or a **weak case** in light of the **competing claims** at play. Much of our time in the profession is taken with **judging** the quality of **all manner** of academic performance, and much of it has to do with **norms of argument**, however much Robbins may worry about their potentially coercive nature.

From time to time I myself have wondered whether my book is too influenced by the modes of academe. But when I read a piece of writing like the one that Elspeth Probyn produced, I find myself feeling a renewed commitment to the evaluative norms of responsible scholarship, and to the idea that clearly agreed-upon genres and protocols of fair scholarship benefit from explicit affirmation at times. Probyn's piece does not conform at all to the conventions of the forum response. She may herself be quite delighted that it does not. Robbins may find himself delighted that she represents a viewpoint that does not agree on my (totalitarian) fundamentals of forum responses. But I would simply say that here we do not have fair or reasoned argument, which is one of the enabling procedures of forum exchanges. Indeed, I hear a different genre altogether: the venting phone call to a friend or intimate. In this genre, which I think we are all familiar with, one is not expected or required to give reasons or evidence, as one is in academic argument. Here's how the phone call might go: "Ugh. I have to write a response to this awful book. I agreed to this because I thought the book had an interesting title; it's called The Way We Argue Now. But I can't get through it; it isn't at all what I expected. I find myself alternately bored and irritated. It's so from the center—totally American parochial, and I just hate the style: polemical in a slam-bam-thank-you-ma'am way—really quite mean-spirited. She's so arrogant. And you wouldn't believe the so-called critique of Foucault. I don't know, I think I'm just sick of abstract theory—I mean, aren't we past this? It's so stultifying. I wish there were some way to get out of the commitment. I don't know how I'm ever going to get to it anyway, with all my journalism deadlines." The friend: "That sounds awful. But just use the occasion to write about something else, something you think is important. Write about yourself. Direct attention to a book that you do like. Whatever you do, don't spend too much time on it. And definitely call her out on the American centrism."

Do we really want to overhear this kind of conversation when we turn to the review section of a journal like Criticism? Of what intellectual value is it to know [End Page 288] Probyn's casual reactions to a book she won't bother responsibly to describe or engage, unless of course we accord to Probyn some sort of authority in advance that makes argument unnecessary. That she herself believes in such argument-by-authority is evident when she tells us, "As Stuart Hall would say, along with any undergraduate in my classes, 'A discourse is a group of statements that provide a language for talking about a particular kind of knowledge about a topic.'" This is the extent of Probyn's searing critique of the problem with advocating debate generally. But note that it relies, first, upon the invocation of an authority, Stuart Hall, and then upon the implication that her students have all entirely absorbed her own channeling of that authority. Probyn is entirely unbothered, moreover, that the undergraduates in her classes unblinkingly accept this empty statement without protest or challenge or further inquiry into its aimless specificity.

Probyn's piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a **pattern** here: precisely the tendency to **personalize argument** and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "**states of injury**." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the book's content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as **directly harming** persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I **object**. Argument is **not injurious** to persons. **Policies** are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can **alienate** and **exclude**. But argument itself is **not directly harmful**; once one says it is, one is **very close** to a logic of **censorship**. The **most productive thing** to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to **produce a response** or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself **directly harms you** is tantamount to saying that you **do not believe** in argument or in the **free exchange** of ideas, that your claim to injury somehow **damns your opponent's ideas**.

When Probyn isn't symptomatic, she's just downright sloppy. One could work to build up the substance of points that she throws out the car window as she screeches on to her next destination, but life is short, and those with considered objections to liberalism and proceduralism would not be particularly well served by the exercise. As far as I can tell, Probyn thinks my discussion of universalism is of limited relevance (though far more appealing when put, by others, in more comfortingly equivocating terms), but she's certain my critique of appeals to identity is simply **not able to accommodate** the importance of identity in social and political life. As I make clear throughout the book, and particularly in my discussion of the headscarf debate in France, identity is likely to be at the **center** of key arguments about life in plural democracies; my point is **not** that identity is **not relevant**, but simply that it should not be used to **trump** or **stifle** argument.

#### TVA – the United States federal government should prohibit anticompetitive barriers, at least including out of state tuition barriers, lack of regional tournaments and online-compatible tournaments, budget disparities, coaching disparities, and procedures barring entry for hybrid policy debate teams – SWG is our solvency advocate

#### Debating antitrust policy does NOT require NOR produce any particular subjectivity -- BUT solves the historical inaccessibility of legal change and are prerequisite to the efficacy of their political project

Greer and Vallas 21 (**Jeremie Greer**, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Director at Liberation in a Generation, a national movement support organization building the power of people of color to totally transform the economy, Soros Equality Fellow, racial justice activist who began his career as a community organizer in the Columbia Heights and Shaw neighborhoods in Washington, DC, and national policy expert on the causes and the policy solutions to close racial wealth gap, formerly working at the Government Accountability Office, the Local Initiative Support Corporation, and Prosperity Now (formerly CFED), MPP George Mason University, BA Social Work, University of St. Thomas, currently working on an Executive Education Certificate in Nonprofit Leadership from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government; interviewed by **Rebecca Vallas**, senior fellow at The Century Foundation, work focuses on economic justice, formerly spent seven years at the Center for American Progress, built and lead CAP’s Poverty to Prosperity Program, and helped to establish CAP’s Disability Justice Initiative, the first disability policy project at a U.S. think tank, as well as the organization’s criminal justice reform work, her policy and advocacy work flows from her years as a legal aid lawyer, representing low-income individuals and families at Community Legal Services in Philadelphia, creator and host of Off-Kilter, a nationally distributed podcast about poverty, inequality, and everything they intersect with, JD University of Virginia, BA psychology, Emory University; “Reimagining Anti-Monopoly Activism Through Racial Justice — feat. Liberation in a Generation’s Jeremie Greer,” Off-Kilter Podcast, 3-26-2021, https://offkiltershow.medium.com/reimagining-anti-monopoly-activism-through-racial-justice-feat-e3a124c1c61)

VALLAS: So, before we get into the report — and there is so much to talk about in this report — you co-founded Liberation in a Generation with Solana Rice, as I mentioned, up top. Talk a little bit about the organization’s vision, its mission. You talk a lot about an oppression economy and a liberation economy being the goal that you’re working to build towards. Talk a little bit about why you co-founded the program.

GREER: Yeah. Thanks for having me, and thanks for that question. Yeah, Liberation in a Generation, it’s really kind of a culmination of Solana and I (Solana Rice, my co-founder) and I really working. You know, originally, both of us have a similar background. Mine is in doing community organizing in the early part of the 2000s, but then also doing a lot of national work at the policy level for kind of Washington think tanks. And it really was birthed because we were really dissatisfied with the model at which a lot of national advocacy organizations were taking to how they were doing racial and economic justice work. And our kind of governing theory of change is that one, the ideas are not bold enough to actually deliver on changing the problems that we were seeing, that the story that we were telling about why these problems were created was actually just wrong, and that we weren’t working with the people that were building the type of political power that’s necessary to make that change. So, we launched Liberation in a Generation.

And what we hope to do is to dismantle what we call the oppression economy, which is an economy that is built on an uncomfortable truth: that racism is profitable in our economy, that institutions can build their wealth, that people can build their wealth based on the existence of systemic racism. And that happens by criminalizing people of color, by operating a dual financial system that extracts from people of color, that our political system and all of its inequalities is meant to prop up this racist economy that we operate in, and that corporate power has too much of a hold over the well-being of people of color in our economy. And that what we need to replace it with is a liberation economy that does real basic things like provides for everyone’s basic needs, creates safety and security, that compensates people for the value that they bring to the economy. And our economy has too long excluded people, but we need an economy that ensures that all people of color belong. And that has to be grounded in a set of economic rights that everybody has and holds and can be entitled to. And that, again, leaders of color that are doing grassroots power building and community organizing are the ones that deliver it. So, that’s who Liberation in a Generation partners with to deliver that future.

VALLAS: Well, and hearing you mention that you’d experienced, and I think very justifiable, dissatisfaction with the way that some of the kind of traditional Washington-based think tanks work on these issues, right? Often it’s about cutting poverty or reducing homelessness, right? And just the contrast with some of what you at Liberation in a Generation and Solana and the team that you guys are building there are, the things that you’re pushing for, right, are just on a different scale. And in some ways, it’s about helping people understand that maybe we can imagine a different world rather than just tinker at the edges.

I want to read another paragraph from this report. You write, “Imagine a world where the unemployment rate for people of color is zero, the unhoused rate for people of color is zero, a world in which 100 percent of people of color have quality healthcare, a livable wage, quality education. We at Liberation in a Generation,” you write, “believe that this is possible if we strive to create a liberation economy where all people of color have their basic needs met, are safe and secure, are valued and fully belong, including people of color who are immigrants, formerly incarcerated, LGBTQ, and have a disability. You finally write, “In order to get to this liberation economy, we must dismantle the oppression economy that monopoly power has colluded with the government to maintain.” And this gets us into really talking about the topic in this report, which is anti-monopoly activism.

Start with a little bit of a primer of what we’re facing. I mentioned a couple of stats up top in the intro helping put sort of a recent and updated lens on how good it is to be a monopolist these days, right? By contrast to everybody else who’s living through this pandemic and not experiencing billions and trillions of dollars of wealth increases. Start with a little bit of a primer of what we’re facing: the rise of unchecked capitalism and monopoly power such that we’re essentially living in a new gilded era, as the report argues.

GREER: Yeah, and just, I mean, you have to, to fully understand the power of, monopoly, you have to understand it through the lens of people of color who have to deal with it. So, in Iowa, and, you know, there’s folks with People’s Action that are organizing people in rural communities around the threat of monopoly. But if you’re looking at Iowa, a corporation like Tyson Foods has managers who are sitting around on the floor (and this is documented in the media) making bets about what worker was going to get sick and die from COVID. Like, the inhumanity of that, I think, is just appalling. But it just shows the dehumanization that monopolies have created for workers, for consumers, for small businesses, and everybody that’s impacted.

And the reason why is because at the core, monopoly power is about exactly that: power, who has it and what they do with it. And what we have when you have monopolies, it’s not just about the size of the firm. There’s a lot of focus on the size of the firm. But what it’s really about is does that firm have a disproportionate amount of power, and what are they doing with that power? And what monopolies today are doing — Amazon, Moderna, Pfizer, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Facebook, Google — they’re taking the power that they have around consumer prices, around workplace conditions, around wages, around the impact that they have in community, and the influence that they have on government, and they’re using that power to profit off of blatant systemic racism that is falling down upon Black and brown workers. And that is, for us, the real fight that we feel when you look at monopolies. And that the current system in which we use to try to govern monopoly power is totally inadequate in dealing with the kind of impact that the monopolies have on Black, Indigenous, Latinx, and Asian-American people in this country.

VALLAS: Now, folks who are listening probably all assume that they know what a monopoly is. But I’m going to sort of poke a hole in that and say, you may think you know what a monopoly is. But Jeremie’s got a slightly broader, and I think, more updated definition that’s used in this report. How do you define a monopoly for purposes of what you guys are doing in this work? And why do you propose a somewhat broader definition?

GREER: Yeah. So, you’re right. The current kind of anti-trust definition of a monopoly really focuses on the impact that monopoly power or corporate power has on consumers, and particularly on consumer prices. So, will you pay more for a product because of the monopoly power that a company has? And as I mentioned, we believe that that’s totally inadequate to really understand the full breadth of what a monopoly is. Monopolies have, yes, they have incredible control over consumer markets and prices. And we see that in healthcare, you know. So, the price of insulin is much higher because of the monopoly power that a company, that pharmaceutical companies hold.

But monopolies also have power over worker wages, the working conditions in which workers show up to work and have to live through. They have incredible power over small businesses. All across the country, we see small businesses being crowded out by monopoly power. They have the political power to almost dictate to local communities how much they’re willing to pay in taxes, which means the crowding out of essential services that are provided to communities. And what we observe in the report is that too often, the impact of that monopoly power falls squarely on the shoulders of people of color, whether they’re workers of color, consumers of color, whether they’re small business owners of color, or whether they’re just people of color living in communities that are looking to their local government to really help them navigate life in the economy.

VALLAS: And I want to quote you, because you offer, I think, a really, really smart definition here in the report. You say, “We define monopoly as a corporate entity — a single corporation, or a group of corporations — whose sheer size and anti-competitive behavior grant it disproportionate economic power and governing influence.” And as you’ve been describing, you say, “This negatively affects the well-being of workers, consumers, markets, local communities, democratic governance, and the planet.” That’s a somewhat broader definition than maybe the sort of technical antitrust definition of monopoly. But for all the reasons you’re starting to get into, you really, you argue in this report that it’s necessary that we think a little more broadly and a little more functionally about who’s operating like a monopoly, and therefore where we need to be thinking about challenging unchecked corporate power.

You’ve already started to delve into the link between unchecked corporate power, monopolistic behavior, and the numerous types of racial injustice and structural racism that run rampant throughout the U.S. economy and our broader society. But you have a very powerful way that you phrase this in this report. You say, “Racial wealth inequality,” and you specifically are talking there about racial wealth inequality, “is the consequential disease caused by the oppression economy.” I can’t remember reading another publication about monopolistic behavior and the need for an anti-trust movement that draws such a direct causal link between monopolies and the ways that they operate, and racial wealth inequality and structural racism. Talk a little bit about how monopolies are contributing to the immense and historic levels of racial wealth inequality that folks are maybe more familiar with, but not aware of that link.

GREER: Yeah. No, thanks for that question. And what I think of an important distinction around the framing there is that, yes, it is driving, monopolies are driving racial wealth inequality. And yes, monopolies are a product of an oppressive economy that is, you know, where racism is baked into the design of the economy. But they’re also a profit tier, they are gaining profit from the existence of that oppression economy. So, it is in their interest to sustain it and maintain it and to keep it going. And an example that we draw out in the paper that I think is so important and I think really illustrates this is, as we mentioned, one of the pillars that holds up the oppression economy is the criminalization of people of color. That people of color as criminals, or defined as criminals, and mass incarceration, the over-policing of Black and brown communities is something that upholds this oppression economy. And then when you have a company like Amazon who purchases the Ring Corporation —

And for those that may not be familiar, Ring is a product that’s provided by Amazon in which they provide surveillance and home security to everyone. You can get a little Ring doorbell where someone rings the door. You could be at work, you can open it. It’s like, “Oh, cool. Leave my package there.” That’s how they market it. But what that does is that that Ring device pulls in a lot of data. And what we have is cameras in homes all across the country that can be used to surveil people. And what we know is one of the things that police do is they over-surveil Black and brown communities, which leads to the type of mass incarceration that we’ve seen in this country. Well, Amazon has contracts, in fact, 770 contracts with police departments so that they can get the data from those Ring devices. So, I think that really illustrates that not only are monopolies driving racial inequality through the low wages that they pay workers, through the way that they crowd out Back businesses, from the way that they treat immigrants at the workplace, but they’re also actively doing things to prop up and uphold this oppression economy because they are profiting from it.

VALLAS: And I really want to encourage folks to read the report, especially activists and advocates who I know we have lots who listen to the show, folks in grassroots-based work who I think are really going to find this report very much geared towards them. That’s another really, I think, significantly unique aspect about what you guys have done here. This isn’t the kind of think tank report that you traditionally read, right? In a lot of ways, you actually really wrote this for, and almost to, grassroots leaders of color as sort of a primer on anti-monopoly activism, but also as something of the beginning of a tool kit that really could help people start to take this on as part and parcel of their work. I’d love to get a little bit into kind of why you structured the report this way, why you took this somewhat different approach in writing, not just for the media and for policymakers and for the Washington elites, but actually for grassroots leaders of color on the ground.

I’m going to quote you again. You write, “This paper aims to contribute a major step in the long journey of bridging the divide between anti-monopoly researchers and policy advocates and grassroots leaders of color.” And you write, “The first step on that journey is knowledge.” What does the current anti-monopoly fight look like? And why do you believe, and Solana as well, why did you guys prioritize bridging this divide?

GREER: Yeah, so, as I mentioned in my opening about Liberation in a Generation, we believe that the leaders that are going to lead us into having a liberation economy and dismantling this oppression economy that we’ve been talking about are grassroots leaders of color who are building power in communities. And the reason why we believe that is one, they are closest to the people who are experiencing the pain and harm of systemic racism. They are in there with them, they understand, they hear their stories, and they’re organizing them for change. The other thing that we believe is so important is that they are in the business of building the power, the political power, of those people. They’re not there to serve them, which there’s people that do that. And there’s a reason for that, and it’s important. But they see their role in helping those people build power so that they can have the agency to force their government, whether it’s a local, state or federal, to act on their behalf.

And we believe that if one of the government’s roles is to curb corporate monopoly power, they should be the ones driving that change. Because they will come with experiences, which we try to reflect in the report, of how monopoly power is impacting communities. You know, how a Amazon distribution center in the Inland Empire in California is impacting not just the economic life, but the quality of life of people in those communities. They could speak to that in real terms. And that not only does the advocacy need to be informed by that, but also the policy making needs to be informed by that.

So, what we did was, with that kind of assumption, we went to groups like the Athena Coalition, who is organizing people against Amazon across the country. We went to Color of Change, who’s an organization that is focusing on curbing the power of big tech: Facebook, Amazon, Google, Apple. We went to ACRE: Action Center for Race and the Economy. And they’re doing a lot of work focusing on big banks and the corporate and monopoly power of big banks. And we said, you know, what is holding the kind of grassroots movement back from really diving in, into this anti-monopoly issue? And they came up with, there was a lot of reasons, a lot of varies they identified, and some of them that we’re working with them to solve.

But one of them was, you know, we don’t have kind of a global understanding of how monopoly power impacts people of color in particular. We understand it through the lens of a particular firm, Amazon, Bank of America, like that. But we don’t really have a good grounding in how it happens globally. Therefore, our policymaking doesn’t have kind of an eye towards how could we globally and kind of more broadly address this problem in a way that impacts people across the economy? So, that’s what we hope that this paper would do: would provide that kind of grounding for grassroots leaders so that they can begin to build the type of strategies that kind of have that massive economy-wide impact for people of color.

VALLAS: And it might be eye-opening for grassroots leaders who are learning about this issue, who are exploring whether this is something that they can get involved with. But it’s also potentially eye-opening for people who already think they know the antitrust movement or the anti-monopoly movement, given that it is incredibly rare, as you point out, for conversations about the economy to really discuss human impacts. They’re often extremely technocratic conversations, right, that have lots of facts and figures and jargon. But something that you really make a point of doing in this report, which I can’t say I’ve ever seen in a report on monopoly power or anti-trust, is you really walk through the human impacts on people of color as workers, as consumers, as residents in local communities, as small business owners and entrepreneurs, and also as subjects of surveillance, similar to the Amazon Ring concerns that you were raising before. Share some of the examples in the report of those kinds of human impacts on people of color who can obviously be more than just one of those things in that list of categories.

GREER: Yeah, I’ll share a couple. There’s one that really, I mean, really broke my heart when I first read about it was Alec Raeshawn Smith, whose mother — and this is something that’s in the media. So, it’s not as if I’m violating any confidentiality here — but Alec Raeshawn Smith, whose mother, he aged off of his mother’s insurance plan. And this is a story we heard a lot during the ACA kind of debate and the debate around universal healthcare. But he aged off of his mother’s insurance plan, and he made this diff-, had to make this difficult choice about whether he continued to allow his mother to bear the burden of his insulin medication that he needed to regulate his diabetes, or whether he would try to do it kind of on his own. And he determined, he decided to do it on his own. And it’s a hard decision that people have to make every single day, but the cost of that insulin was so high that he was rationing it, that he wasn’t taking what the doctor prescribed. And he passed, and he died from his diabetes.

And this is the type of story that we see all too often. You know, his insulin costs were $1,300 a month without insurance. And we see that a corporation that can control pricing of pharmaceuticals for a lifesaving drug like insulin is how this plays out in real life. And we can get into a law, you know, you can get into a law classroom or into a debate on Congress, and you can start to forget about the real lives that are impacted by these policies. And the reason why we wanted to talk about these stories is because that is what organizers are dealing with every day: They’re working with people that are on insulin, you know. They are working with people who are working at a Amazon fulfillment center. They’re working with people who can’t get a bank account because Bank of America has all these fees on their credit cards and their checking accounts and things like that. So, bringing these stories out is what is going, and this real human impact, is what is going to mobilize, we believe, the type of effort that’s needed to fight back against monopoly power.

VALLAS: And I think we’ve got time for a few more examples, because it just, it isn’t the part of the conversation that usually gets any airtime. And it’s part of why I wanted to have you on the show is really to put a human face on some of the impacts. Share a few more examples that really, that popped for you as you were pulling this report together.

GREER: Sure. I’d love to talk about John Ingram, who is a Black farmer in Jackson, Mississippi, and he’s a chicken farmer. He grows chickens, and he sells his chickens to Koch Foods, K-o-c-h Foods. And they are the fifth largest poultry company in the country that provides food to places all across the country. But the model which they work with John is very much in the model of the sharecropping model from post-Civil War and on into the Jim Crow era. You know, they determine the way in which John must run his farm, like to how much he feeds his chickens, to the types of facilities he keeps his chickens in, all the way to the price that they will pay to buy his chickens. And what this does is create incredible power over Black farmers like John. And what you have is — And this is pretty much allowed to take place by the USDA.

He had complained, and Black farmers, many Black farmers complained to the Obama-era USDA. And because of the power of those poultry monopolies — you know, I mentioned one in the beginning, Tysons and Koch is another — they really didn’t do anything. And what we see across the country are Black farmers being forced out of business because of the power that these monopolies have.

Another example that I think is really good is also in Mississippi. There’s a Nissan plant that was built in Canton, Mississippi. They relocated there. And they had gotten there because they had gotten a lot of tax breaks from the local government, from the state of Mississippi. And they did so with the promise of good jobs. They talked about jobs would be between $26 and $26 an hour. Well, the type of jobs that they provided were called perma-temp jobs. And these are basically permanent temporary jobs, which I can’t really wrap my mind around what that is, because those are conflicting. Like, what is something that’s permanent and temporary? But they created these jobs that were permanent and temporary, which basically meant that they could at will fire people from their jobs.

So, these aren’t real sound jobs. The wages were low. They did not get great benefits. So, a lot of the promise that was offered was not delivered upon. And that these were primarily the jobs that were provided in this part of Mississippi, despite the millions in tax breaks that Nissan got from, again, the state of Mississippi and the local government there.

VALLAS: And there’s so many more examples throughout the report. We’ve got a link and show notes so folks can go in and can sort of page through. It’s written in an incredibly accessible way, right? So, I want to just make that point. You intentionally set this up so that you don’t have to be a lawyer to read this. You don’t have to be a deep antitrust expert to be able to read this. This is actually really for people who might be a little bit newer to the issue.

And one of the big kind of frames of the report as well is you spend a lot of time discussing how, you know, hey, we know folks are busy. We know folks are fighting a lot of fights right now and probably don’t feel like they’ve got one more to take on, space for one more to take on. But you really make the point that for folks who are working on, say, advancing the Green New Deal or the Homes Guarantee or other policies within the social and the economic and the racial justice advocacy sphere, you really make the point that challenging monopoly power is actually a prerequisite to succeeding in those other fights. What’s your message to advocates and to activists and policy folks, anyone who’s listening or who might read the report, what’s your message to them about why they should see the anti-monopoly fight as their own, even if they feel like that’s not the space that they work in?

GREER: Yeah, I mentioned Action Center for Race and the Economy. Mo BP-Weeks, who is a co-director there, often says, You just have to follow the money.” And I think organizers know that when you follow the money, you usually find exactly the targets that you need. And there’s a section in the report called Monopoly Power Is Corporate Power Magnified and Maximized. And we believe, and I think that we’re right, that if you focus in on and treat these monopolies like corporate entities, you can begin to see change in a lot of the transformative movements that people are having, for example, the Green New Deal and efforts to create a more equitable and healthy environment and to curb climate change. You know, the targets are Big Oil and Big Energy. And those institutions, while they’re large, still operate like corporations. They have a CEO, they have Board of Directors, they have shareholders. And all of those people have some stake in the company and have some culpability to the issues that you are trying to solve. So, it becomes another tool in the toolbox.

We believe that anti-monopoly advocacy is just another tool in the toolbox that could be used to curb corporate power so that you can begin to get wins on other issues that you may be focusing on, whether it is the environment, whether it is affordable housing, whether it’s creating higher wages for workers, whether it is to create a safer community free of police violence. We think that by focusing on curbing the monopoly power of the corporations that are causing that pain is just another tool that can be used in the advocacy for those broader kind of movement priorities that we hear a lot about.

VALLAS: Now, one of the things that you and I have talked about a good amount before, and something that we actually get into a lot on this podcast, is the narratives that are out there that we’re often sort of fighting against that might be invisible, but that shape people’s views about, say, the economy and economic policy, even if they’re not aware that that’s the sort of lens that they’re looking through or the pair of glasses that they’re looking through. It’s also something that you really spend a lot of time working on. And it’s very, it’s central, really, to a lot of what Liberation in a Generation is advancing, is narrative change, right? Especially dismantling, for example, the neoliberal narratives that are really at the root of so many of the social injustices that folks who listen to the show are out there fighting every day.

You talk about government, in the case of the anti-monopoly fight, as a villain and as complicit with corporations in allowing unchecked corporate power to do the damage that you’ve been talking about, that we’ve been discussing up to this point. But you actually talk about them in the context of the anti-monopoly fight government as the villain who could turn into the hero. Talk about why you think it’s so important to construct a narrative with a villain, with a hero. And we’ll get back now into kind of the policy conversation of this, why government has the potential to turn from being a villain to being a hero in this context.

GREER: Yeah, I mean, it’s really, when you look at the history of anti-monopoly advocacy, you see that there once was a time where the government was an active participant in curbing corporate power and was doing so on behalf of workers. You know, you see there were passages of transformative legislation like the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act or the Federal Trade and Commissions Act. And these were all passed in the early 20th century. And they were meant to curb this kind of corporate monopoly power in, you know, back in the Gilded Age when we saw the trust corporations, the railroads, the Carnegie steel industry. And there was this active role of government doing this.

But what we’ve seen since then is, as corporate power grew, begin to influence government more, a real devolution of that activist role the government played. And what we began to see really, you know, and probably the heyday of this for the monopolies began in the 1980s and continues on today, was actual collusion between the government and these monopolies. And that what we saw, what we see today is there have been, there were more mergers and acquisitions under Obama administration than any other administration before it. So, we’re at the point now where the government is really seen as a, it’s really a collaborator in building monopoly power.

What we need to get back to is a place where the government is playing its role in making sure that not just the, it’s not just about the size of the company, but that the company’s power is not getting to the point where they’re bringing down the standard of living for workers, particularly Black, Latinx, Indigenous, and Asian-American workers. That consumers are seeing the type of prices so that they can afford the things that they need to live a daily life. That small businesses, particularly Black businesses, are not being crowded out. And that that is a role for government. So, government can be the hero, and it should be the hero because it is our government, you know.

We are a democracy. We should have say, each and every one of us, in what our government does, and our government should be working on our behalf, not on behalf of Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, or Elon Musk. We should be expecting the government to play that active role, and not just recognizing that it should be done for all workers, but ensuring that workers of color in particular and people of color, households of color in particular, are being protected against the tyranny of monopoly power.

VALLAS: And one of the later chapters in the report really offers kind of a primer in some of that early 20th century history that you were just summarizing around the time when government in the U.S. actually did take action to rein in monopoly power. You mentioned the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, all of that, I would encourage folks to go in and read. And there’s probably a lot that folks don’t know about that era following the gilded era, that really was the time when the federal government in the U.S. did actually take action to check corporate power. Who are the key players with power in the federal government to do something about this? And what are some of the existing solutions that are being advanced?

GREER: Yeah. So, today, I mean, it’s your Congress, of course, has a lot of power. Because there’s an, I believe, there’s a need for new kind of legislation that new powers be created, new constructions of how we regulate monopoly that only Congress could do by passing laws. But under our current laws, the Federal Trade Commission is responsible for responding and kind of being the first, the cop on the beat to make sure that companies aren’t violating any of our current antitrust laws. They can issue criminal and civil penalties, and they are the ones who are in charge of enforcing those kind of monumental legislation that we’ve talked about.

The Justice Department also has a important role in moving legislation forward. In fact, they are the entity that when you hear about breaking up corporations, the Justice Department is the one that usually does that. And they’ve done it in the past. You know, they did it. They broke up the big railroad monopolies of the past, and they broke up AT&T in the 1970s into what they call the Baby Bells. And they currently have a lawsuit today against Google to look at Google’s monopoly power. And in the lawsuit, there’s a call for breaking it up into smaller pieces. So, there’s that.

And then there’s other agencies, you know. As it relates to banking, it’s the Department of Treasury with the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Agency, the CFPB in banking. In agriculture, it’s the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In energy, it’s the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency. Each of these industries kind of have their own government entity that is responsible for regulating the work that they do. And they play a role in curbing corporate power. And one other one that I’d mention is states. State Attorney Generals also have a lot of power to curb corporate power, because one thing that’s little known is that states are the ones that incorporate corporations. And so, they have a lot of ability and a lot of power to regulate agencies.

As far as solutions go, there’s a lot of solutions that are kind of out there. And what this report does not do is propose to put forth a particular solution that would work for people of color, because we actually think that that’s the work that grassroots leaders of color should embark on in the future, is designing and developing those particular solutions. But some of the solutions that we have in our toolbox today are, for example, breaking up large corporations. That is something that we can do today. We can also regulate, tightly regulate corporations using the existing tools in the toolbox. The CFPB and what it’s done in the banking industry is a good example of that.

But one idea that’s been batted around, and I think Elizabeth Warren proposes for big tech in particular, is new enforcement agencies that are more in line with the realities that we see in the economy today and the way in which monopolies form. A lot of our laws are meant, were developed to regulate railroad and steel monopolies, and those aren’t the monopolies that we’re seeing today. So, there is a group of folks out there talking and saying that there’s a real need to think about new agencies with new authorities that could regulate monopoly power.

VALLAS: And of course, it’s not exactly a pie-in-the-sky idea to think about creating those new agencies. Elizabeth Warren, who you mentioned, right, was the godmother of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the CFPB, which is pretty young as far as federal agencies go. It was created during the Obama years. Although that may feel like a different lifetime at this point in a lot of ways.

We’re going to run out of time. But the last couple of minutes that we have, I’d really love to spend delving into the recommendation that really is, in a lot of ways, the kind of central call of this report. A lot of it is really addressed to grassroots leaders, and for the reasons you’ve discussed, right, about bridging that divide. But it’s also addressed to the existing anti-monopoly tent: the folks who are already working within research and advocacy spaces on these issues. And you say very pointedly, “The anti-monopoly movement, within research and advocacy spaces especially, should embolden grassroots leaders of color to deliver anti-racist policy solutions aimed specifically to curtail monopoly power.” So, there you’re describing that agenda that you think grassroots leaders really should be centered in developing. But you continue. You actually, you sort of raise the ante with this call. You also say, “It’s not enough to speak virtuously about racial equity and economic justice. We have to intentionally center people of color in the development of policy change.”

And you call explicitly for a reimagination of this movement through a racial justice lens that broadens the tent and intentionally makes this work more accessible and more human-impact focused so that it’s not just about bringing folks in and centering the work differently. It’s actually about doing the work differently, entirely, so that it’s not just that technocratic and sort of small-tent D.C. elite approach to changing these policies. Talk a little bit about what that actually would look like. You have some pretty specific ideas that, I agree with you, would actually transform the anti-monopoly movement in ways that would reimagine it and approach the work differently. Get concrete. What would that actually look like?

GREER: Yeah, and thank you for this question, Rebecca. You know, I mentioned that history. And I think what we know about public policy and the history of public policy in the United States, whether it was this antitrust movement in response to the Gilded Age, whether it was the New Deal, is that when it’s done in a race-neutral way, it doesn’t just leave people of color behind — Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Asian Americans — it also harms people of color. And what we need to do is, of course, what we can learn from that history is that we should not repeat it. And we should not repeat it, by centering people of color as the core beneficiaries of the policy. Because we believe if that is done, not only will they be served, but we will all then be served because we’re ensuring that we’re not leaving anyone behind, and we’re not intentionally harming anyone. And we think that that’s so critically important in this kind of new era of antitrust policy that could come forth.

You know, we talk about this renaissance of antitrust back in the early part of the century, but at the time, many Black people could still not join a union. Many, many Black people could not get jobs in these new corporations that were being formed by the railroad, by the breaking up of the railroads. So, we have to acknowledge that the implementation of policy and ensuring that all people are a part of it are critically important. And we believe that no one is better at that than people that organize, that are in fellowship, and work with people of color every single day closest to the problem can do. And that that knowledge that they have, that expertise that they have in those folks’ lived experience, is exactly what policymakers need to craft the type of policies necessary. It is what the think tanks in Washington need. It is what the policymakers on Capitol Hill need. It is what the entire advocacy apparatus needs. And we would like to see that being applied to this area.

But what that means is not bringing people to the table in a kind of like, you know, tell us what you think, and then we’ll get back to you. We actually believe that those folks should be leading those conversations. They should be leading the crafting of that policy. And that the role of the think tank or of the policymaker or the antitrust lawyer should be to support them in that endeavor, but with them at the helm. And we think that that is critically important in all areas of policy, but especially in this one that has been so technocratic, so legalistic, so academic, and really devoid of many of the lived experiences that people have navigating the economy and fighting back against these monopolies.

VALLAS: And you’ve got some really, really, really concrete and tangible recommendations in there that I feel like if researchers or Hill staff or think tankers are listening — and I know that’s a lot of the folks who listen to this show, too — there’s stuff in there that folks can just literally put on their to-do list, like creating measures that actually assess impacts on Black and Latinx and Indigenous and Asian and Pacific Islander people, right, as they’re actually thinking about how we evaluate solutions.

GREER: Right.

VALLAS: Or you also call for just using less jargon and less abstraction and focusing maybe a little bit less on just like the markets and the efficiencies and all of those terms, right, in favor of talking a little bit more about the impact of corporate decisions on people, human people, right: the folks that are actually at the core of why we need to be challenging corporate power.

GREER: Think bold. Think big. We need to think big. We need to think boldly. We can’t get caught up into the minutia of what can get done today. We need to think big about what could happen tomorrow. So, yeah, that’s another one. Mmhmm.

#### Even if they win all of their arguments, reading a new non-topical Aff without disclosing it before the round is a voting issue---it crushes all their defense to fairness and testing because there’s no time for pre-round prep and it proves that they’ve agreed to the concept of debate as a game because they strategically choose when to disclose and not based on competitive drivers---the interpretation of allowing non-topical affs but requiring tags and advocacy statements to be disclosed solves their offense

### frames

**Next Off – Frame Subtraction:**

#### First – our links:

#### Neoliberal lexicon

#### Aff deployment of the term “anti-competitive business practices against hybrid teams” is an example of this neoliberal discourse – use of “exclusionary practices towards hybrid teams” solves

Lipman & Saltman ‘7

Pauline Lipman is a Professor of Educational Policy Studies and Director of the Collaborative for Equity and Justice in Education, University of Illinois Chicago. In this section Lipman is being interviewed by Kenneth J. Saltman – who a Professor of Educational Policy Studies, University of Illinois Chicago. From Chapter 4 – “Feasting on Disaster: Urban School Policy, Globalization, and the Politics of Disaster”- From the Book: Schooling and the Politics of Disaster, edited by Kenneth J. Saltman - Copyright Year 2007, Published May 24, 2007 - p.96

Kenneth: In my book Capitalizing on Disaster I looked at some of the language that the right has used in talking about Hurricane Katrina, and its fascinating because they endlessly described Hurricane Katrina as a "silver lining" in the storm. This was a phrase that I found earliest with Clint Bollick of the Alliance for School Choice and then it got endlessly replicated on television news and newspapers. And they created a disaster metaphor and painted disaster as a happy outcome, and it was a happy outcome because it was enabling a long-standing, decades-long privatization agenda, but the language in this case is just the tip of the iceberg. What we're getting at here is the question of language, and the intersection of neoliberal language (business language like choice, efficiency, monopoly, competition, that has been so celebrated in the literature by privatization advocates) with disaster language, like failure, discipline, opportunity. In the case of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, the company Alvarez and Marsal were brought in to do contracting work and they were described as turnaround specialists," through entrepreneurial language. Can you speak about this intersection and this language?

Pauline: I think it's a really interesting point. What I was thinking about when you were talking was how racialized all or this is, and how we haven't discussed that much. In the U.S., race plays a very important role in the neoliberal agenda, in the agenda of the right, and the politics of disaster. That is the central point around which all of that language revolves. What has really failed that's embedded in that language is the people—the people are the failures. When wc talk about the "failure" of urban schools it's really the people in those schools that are constructed as the failures. When we talk about the "failure" of urban neighborhoods, its the people who are constructed as the failures, and in fact the solutions that are proposed, like Hope VI redevelopment projects, are justified by that pathologizing discourse.

#### C -- Neolib discourse *creates realities* which re-frame the social violence cited by the Aff. That link turns case … it’s also external offense via neolib’s perpetuation of sexualized, racialized, and socio-economic repression.

#### Della Faille ‘15

Dr. Dimitri DELLA FAILLE (PhD, Sociology) is a professor in International Development and Social Sciences at Université du Québec en Outaouai - “A Sociological Understanding of Neoliberal Discourses of Development” - #E&F - https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02046915/document

This paper will attempt to show that social scientists studying development issues must consider these common ideas with considerable caution. We argue that words are, in fact, actions. And as such, they must be investigated. We contend that an examination of underdevelopment and "developing" societies must go beyond an artificial divide between discourse and action. But also, that it must not limit its definition of discourse to an act of deception. Otherwise, we run the risk of misunderstanding social problems, which is the basis for much social action and collective mobilization in the "developing" world. We will also propose in this paper a number of ways to examine language and discourse that go beyond received ideas. We will attempt to show that they are integral parts of action - whether scholarly, activist, administrative or otherwise - against underdevelopment. In the first place, we will focus most of our explanation on how neoliberal governance and policymaking use language, social representation and discourse to achieve their goals. Using example of neoliberal discourses, we will attempt to show how the main ideologies of the various contemporary development discourses transforms our perception and understanding of development problems. This transformation, we argue, exists both in imposing the use of specific words and in successfully controlling means of communication.

We will begin with a quick presentation of discourse and a definition of neoliberal ideologies. Then, we will demonstrate how discourse analysis could study neoliberal discourses by applying to documents about a natural disaster in the Philippines. After this demonstration, we present other various examples of discourse analysis as it applies to development discourses. Then, we present some of the major approaches and methodologies of discourse analysis. Before concluding, we will present some ethical considerations for the analysis of development discourses.

Words of Caution

A paper about language and discourse would fall short of its goal to draw attention to the use of language if it did not contain at least some form of criticism of usages of the word "development". We argue that calling societies "developing" is actually making a normative statement about the past trajectory, current status and expected future of these societies. Social scientists may contend that political, scientific, ethical or lay statements about development and underdevelopment are in fact "problematizations" of human societies. A problematization is a process by which social relations, practices, rules, institutions, and habits previously established are suddenly viewed as doubtful and problematic (Foucault 2001). The word "development" itself may carry different meanings around the world (Thornton et al. 2012). The understanding and expectations of actions in the name of "development" are conditioned by social representations and interpretations. However, we contend that development discourses are problematizations of the "developing" world because they transform the history of societies of Latin America, Asia, Africa and some parts of Europe into a long story of troubles and failures. They do that in order to justify social transformations and interventions (Escobar 1994). We also contend that they are problematizations because they produce cultural discourses that apply specifically to "developing" countries, and therefore reinforce ideas about the perceived superiority of "developed" countries over the rest of the world (Mohanty 1984).

This paper refuses to hierarchize societies based on perceptions of their economic achievement, their form of political governance or the global recognition of their cultural products. We recognize that discourses about "development" are problematizations, and that perceptions of any social, political or cultural inferiority of these regions, countries or populations must be criticized. We therefore use the term "developing" for some societies, not as a normative statement on regions, countries, and populations viewed as economically, socially, politically or culturally inferior to the "developed world", but rather as an unfortunate shortcut to describe regions and countries in which actors desire to act in the name of "development". There is a wealth of scholarly literature on criticism of the use of the word "development", some of which is evoked further in this paper.

We will give further explanations that might help you better understand why we must be cautious when comparing societies in terms of their perceived "development". Now that we explained why we, in this paper, are cautious of talking about "development" and "underdevelopment", let us very briefly present some aspects of discourse and its analysis.

Understanding discourse and its analysis

If discourse analysis is getting more recognition in development studies, before we further embark in this paper it must be noted that if you chose to study discourse, you might encounter disapproval (Ziai 2015). As we have argued elsewhere, discourse analysis is often viewed with reservations or criticized in the context of the study of "development" and "underdevelopment" (Delia Faille 2011; 2014). But very often, the criticism comes from misunderstanding of what discourse actually is. Discourse analysts face many commonly held ideas, as per the examples we have provided in the introduction of this paper. We believe that the best way for social scientists to justify the analysis of words, language and communication is to approach it with a clear definition of discourse that relates to the study of social relations and also to present convincing analysis. This section attempts to clarify our definition of discourse analysis and the following sections will attempt to illustrate how this analysis relates to the study of social relations and "development".

Social scientists studying discourses are examining the social and institutional constraints of language. At the conceptual level, language can be apprehended either as a social fact determined by material conditions and social domination, or as a field of social activity with specific rules and a social environment where meaning, social relations, and society are produced. Most discourse analysts adopt the latter conception. They attempt to reveal the strategies that aim to convey cultural values and ideologies, whether implicitly or explicitly. They define language as the production of meaning and the results of acts of communication that are conditioned by collective rules and social codes. Through the use of language, social groups and individuals come to build their identity, describe themselves, interact, and share ideas. Language is thus more than the use of specific vocabularies and grammars. It is an organized sequence of social acts that is not limited to speech or utterance. Some analysts study images and material artefacts as sequences of social acts and social strategies to convey ideologies.

In the 1960s French and British philosophers, sociologists and political scientists began to understand the production of language in terms of communication strategies. This new direction was dubbed the "linguistic turn" of humanities and social sciences (Rorty 1967). Based on several decades of debate in literary study, linguistics and anthropology, discourse analysis emerged as a new discipline. It proposed a way to see language as a field of social confrontation and struggles. Discourse is therefore understood as the social usage of language and studied as a social practice and a materialization of social relations. It means that discourse analysts are interested in the social practice of using language to put forward agendas, to express dissent, to defend a position, or to transmit values. They also study acts of silencing and censoring - such as prohibiting other worldviews from circulating and being heard. Therefore, discourse analysts see language as a series of social processes and they acknowledge that language is not limited to otherwise unrelated individual acts.

Discourse analysis could be described as a political understanding of the use of language in the context of unequal access to platforms of decision making, economic resources, and social recognition. As we will attempt to demonstrate throughout this paper, the study of discourse is not limited to looking for hidden agendas, lies or the uttering of meaningless and empty words. Deception is only one of the strategies used to convey worldviews, and it is not necessarily the most effective or even the most interesting for discourse analysts.

Some schools of discourse analysis criticize social reproduction of gender inequality, racism and social class. Critical Discourse Analysis is an example of this field. For this school of thought, discourse analysis is the social study of language, its social constraints and its effects (Fairclough 2001). Through language, social groups come to represent society in a way that perpetuates domination, positive or negative discrimination, and social repression. Critical discourse analysts look at the perpetuation of social conflicts and unequal relations of power. They examine issues related to gender, sexuality, social class, and ethnicity.

While our presentation of neoliberal discourses and its analysis does not fall totally under the umbrella of the school of Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper demonstrates how to analyse discourse in the context of the study of global inequalities, social discrimination and repression. We are critical of the current state of global politics, economy and society as it reproduces and reinforces inequalities. Therefore, the next section presents a critical analysis of neoliberalism understood as an ideology whose aim is to impose its ~~worldviews~~ (perspective) and the interest of the actors it attempts to defend and whose interests this ideology is putting forward in the context of development discourses.

#### Our Alt: We can defend the rest of their advocacy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is the best alt:

#### One – no plan means any part of the 1AC can become the nexus question by the 2AR, we should reciprocally get to conditionally critique their frames and narrow the debate to parts of disagreement by the 2NR.

#### Two – – Praxis: our model teaches a form of engagement that corrects flaws in political strategies. Rejecting our approach is normatively worse for the Aff’s own cause.

Williams ‘15

Douglas Williams is a third-generation organizer, He earned his BA in Political Science at the University of Minnesota at Morris and his MPA at the University of Missouri Columbia, where he was also a Thurgood Marshall Fellow and a Stanley Botner Fellow. He is currently a doctoral student in political science at Wayne State University in Detroit, where his research centers around public policy as it relates to disadvantaged communities and the labor movement. From the article: “The Dead End of Identity Politics” - From: The South Lawn - March 10, 2015 – Internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer, Purdue University. DeBoer holds a PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue and an MA in English, concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance a capital “B” was adjusted to a lower case “b” in a manner that boosted readability, but did not alter context. https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. Refusing to say ‘*this* is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making *that* accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.”

----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer)

Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

#### Three – contingent agreement is good: negating the whole aff makes only the most extreme retorts strategic, like prejudice is good. We should debate framing strategies rather than impact turns to injustice

#### Four – its fair: frame subtraction auto gives the aff ground – just defend the args placed in the 1AC. This applies to all frames that we may critique.

## case

### 1nc – presumption

#### Vote NEG on presumption:

#### 1 – inherency’s a burden of proof – they already performed – NO reason ballot is key

#### 2 – turns case – symbolically affirming their method despite its disconnection from the material ONLY strengthens the logistical forces they’re trying to resist

Rigakos and Law 9 (George Rigakos, Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University, and Alexandra Law, PhD, Legal Studies, Carleton University, “Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance,” Critical Sociology 35(1) 79-103, dml)

McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not ‘duped’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects ‘are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject’s dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they:

query why subversive ‘assertions of self’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power … By standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227)

Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity.

Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that ‘powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless’ considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made and remade’. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued ‘real’ existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of ‘constructs’ such as class.

Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration:

[T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. … [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes.

#### It is magnified by their call for a ballot --- a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### This is offense for us – you should reject a flattening description of complex realities like exclusion of hybrid teams – there’s no single theory of power BUT grappling with practical alterations is key to successful critical theorizing

Wilson 05 et al; Arthur Wilson, Professor and Chair of Cornell's Dept. of Education, "The Problem of Power," Adult Education Research Conference. #E&F – modified for language that may offend - https://newprairiepress.org/aerc/2005/papers/10

In this paper we have started integrating what we have been learning from these various traditions about what power is and how it works. We refrain from arguing for a particular ~~point of view~~ (perspective) because we lack the hubris to believe a total or single theory of power is possible or desirable. Indeed, a key argument we make in this paper is that there are many theories of power, and hence many problems, because power is recursively imbricated in all human interactions. So, one might ask, who cares, why should we endeavor to understand power and its play in our educational work? We suggest two reasons here. First is a practical response. The world is routinely, systematically unjust and power is a major facilitator of inequitable production and distribution of resources, benefits, accesses, etc. Within a general “critical” project, we ~~see~~ (feel) the need to develop more adequate theories of power in order to improve the lives of human beings because much traditional theory (e.g., the three faces) has failed “to fully comprehend the role of power in shaping human life” (Wartenberg, 1992, p. xi). We agree with Wartenberg that too many power theorists have been unable to appreciate the complexities and nuances of power: “power manifests itself as a complex social presence that exists in an intricate network of overlapping and contradictory relations. The task . . . is to provide a conception of power that does justice to its tangled empirical reality while at the same time providing the social theorists with a precise tool for criticizing social practices and institutions. In particular, theories of power must explain the immersion of human beings in nets of power relations that constrain their possibilities while simultaneously uncovering the means by which human beings have the ability to resist and challenge those relations” (1992, p. xix). Thus we wish to promote Wartenberg’s argument for critical social inquiry that develops explanatory language that accounts for the “newly discovered complexity” of power and how it works. Second, following on Wartenberg’s suggestion, we need more than awareness; we need means. Because of the epistemological proclivities of academic adult education (among other conditions too numerous to detail), there is a fundamental problem with the discipline’s theoretical work: the theory-practice gap. That gap has persisted for so long, we now take it for granted. Among many reasons, the theory-gap persists because generally the discipline of adult education lacks a theory of practical action. Isaac provides one example of why a theory of practical action is necessary: “Theories of power . . . should be conceived as interpretative models, developed by social scientists as submitted to the rigors of critical consideration, about social structures which shape human action and distribute the capacities to act among social agents” (1987, p. 75). Neither adult education theory or much of its practice has generally been able to meet such a standard. If we cannot “see” the conditions in which we enact our social practices (like education), then we can have little hope of challenging or changing inequitable ones. This is the larger problem to which this paper is directed although we are only able to set the stage here for such an encounter. If we as a discipline are ever to have important things to ~~say~~(contend) about the work of adult educators, then we have to work towards transcending this gap. So we use the paper to begin developing a more general theory of power (or rather theories) via working toward a theory of practical action that sees power as a central constituent of human educational interaction. Because power is constructed in and through social interactions, it is always alterable and disruptable, hence the importance of understanding and using power in adult education.

It’s not just defense - a ballot against us is far-too local and trades-off with broader, communal, out-of-round remedies.

Ritter ‘13

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The fiction of social change through debate abuses the win—loss structure of debate and permits deabters to otherize, demonize, dehumanize, and exclude opponents. The win-loss structure of debate rounds requires a judge to vote for one side or the other, as judges generally cannot give a double win. This precludes the possibility of compromise on any major position in the debate when the resolution of the position would determine the ultimate issue of "which team did the better debating." Thus, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to construct narratives of good versus evil in which the other team is representative of some evil that threatens to bring about our destruction if it is endorsed (e.g. capitalism). The team relying on the fiction of social change through debate then paints themselves as agents of the good, and gives the judge a George W. Bush-like "option": "You're either with us or you're against us." The fiction of social change through debate—like Bush's rhetorical fear tactics and creation of a false, polarizing, and exclusionary dichotomy to justify all parts of the War on Terror—enables the otherization, demonization, dehumanization, and exclusion of the opposing team. When the unfairness of this tactic is brought to light—particularly in egregious situations when a team is arguing that the other team should lose because of their skin color—all can see that the debate centers on personal attacks against opposing debaters. This causes tensions between debaters that frequently result in debaters losing interest or quitting. By alienating and excluding members of the competitive interscholastic debate community for the purpose of winning a debate, it also makes the reaching of any compromise outside of the debate—the only place where compromise is possible—much less likely. By bringing the social issue into a debate round, debaters impede out-of-round progress on the resolution of social issues within and outside the debate community by prompting backlash.

#### It's a turn for the neg – signal-driven change through a win-only framework drives backlash and undermines their critical project

Panetta 9 – Dr. Edward Panetta, Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of Georgia, and Jarrod Atchison, then Director of Debate at Trinity University, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Ed. Lunsford, Rosa, and Eberly, p. 317-334

Debates as Sites of Community Change

The debate community has become more self-reflexive and increasingly invested in attempting to address the problems that have plagued the community from the start. The degrees to which things are considered problems and the appropriateness of different solutions to the problems have been hotly contested, but some fundamental issues, such as diversity and accessibility, have received considerable attention in recent years. This section will address the “debate as activism” perspective that argues that the appropriate site for addressing community problems is individual debates. In contrast to the “debate as innovation” perspective, which assumes that the activity is an isolated game with educational benefits, proponents of the “debate as activism” perspective argue that individual debates have the potential to create change in the debate community and society at large. If the first approach assumed that debate was completely insulated, this perspective assumes that there is no substantive insulation between individual debates and the community at large. From our perspective, using individual debates to create community change is an insufficient strategy for three reasons. First, individual debates are, for the most part, insulated from the community at large. Second, individual debates limit the conversation to the immediate participants and the judge, excluding many important contributors to the debate community. Third, locating the discussion within the confines of a competition diminishes the additional potential for collaboration, consensus, and coalition building.

The first problem that we isolate is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc.), rarely does any one debate have the power to create community-wide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems inherent in individual debates and the collective forgetfulness of the debate community.

The structural problems stem from the current tournament format that has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but the ballot is rarely seen by anyone outside the tabulation room. Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is little documentation of what actually transpired during the debate round. During the period when judges interact with the debaters, there are often external pressures (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc.) that restrict the ability of anyone outside the debate to pay attention to the judges’ justification for their decision. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simultaneously, and travel schedules dictate that most of the participants have left by the later elimination rounds. It is difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems.

In addition to the structural problems, the collective forgetfulness of the debate community reduces the impact that individual debates have on the community. The debate community is largely made up of participants who debate and then move on to successful careers. The coaches and directors that make up the backbone of the community are the people with the longest cultural memory, but they are also a small minority of the community when considering the number of debaters involved in the activity. This is not meant to suggest that the activity is reinvented every year—certainly there are conventions that are passed down from coaches to debaters and from debaters to debaters. However, the basic fact remains that there are virtually no transcriptions available for the community to read, and, therefore, it is difficult to substantiate the claim that the debate community can remember any one individual debate over the course of several generations of debaters. Additionally, given the focus on competition and individual skill, the community is more likely to remember the accomplishments and talents of debaters rather than a specific winning argument. The debate community does not have the necessary components in place for a strong collective memory of individual debates. The combination of the structures of debate and the collective forgetfulness means that any strategy for creating community change that is premised on winning individual debates is less effective than seeking a larger community dialogue that is recorded and/or transcribed.

A second problem with attempting to create community change in individual debates is that the debate community is comprised of more individuals than the four debaters and one judge that are present in every round. Coaches and directors have very little space for engaging in a discussion about community issues. This is especially true for coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not have access to many debates. Coaches and directors should have a public forum to engage in a community conversation with debaters instead of attempting to take on their opponents through the wins and losses of their own debaters.

In addition to coaches and debaters, there are many people who might want to contribute to a community conversation, but are not directly involved in competition. For instance, most debate tournaments take place at an academic institution that plays host to the rest of the community. For that institution to host everyone, they must make tremendous sacrifices. It would be beneficial to the debate community to have some of the administrators who make decisions about supporting debate come to a public forum and discuss what types of information they need when they make decisions about program funding. Directors and coaches would benefit from having administrators explain to the community how they evaluate the educational benefits of debate. Additionally, every institution has unique scholars who work in some area and who could be of benefit to the debate community. The input of scholars who study argument, communication, race, gender, sexuality, economics, and the various other academic interests could provide valuable advice to the debate community. For example, a business professor could suggest how to set up a collective bargaining agreement to reduce the costs associated with travel. Attempting to create an insulated community that has all the answers ignores the potential to create very powerful allies within academic institutions that could help the debate community. After all, debate is not the first community to have problems associated with finances, diversity, and competition. These resources, however, are not available for individual debates. The debate community is broader than the individual participants and can achieve better reform through public dialogue than individual debates.

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community.

However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.

From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

2NC  
**This also address every Aff link claim about the surrounding “context of its deployment”. These terms provide an opening for the neoliberal encroachment. It is bett*er* to endorse the 1AC sans any such rhetoric.**

**Budd ‘97**

John Budd is an Emeritus Prof in the College of Education and Human Development at the Univ of Missouri –“A Critique of Customer and Commodity” - College & Research Libraries – vol 58:4 - #E&F – obtained via the EBSCO Open Access Journals Database

**Discussion**

One of the most important things to keep in mind with regard to customers and commodities is that the language librarians use to describe their purpose and activities inevitably **will define**, **even if they do not initially reflect**, thought. For instance, even though Brown says that "it is useful to understand more about the service interaction and what it is that makes 'buying' and evaluating a service (such as reference service) different for the customer than 'buying' and evaluating a material product," she proceeds to speak of consumption and retail analogy to describe reference work in academic libraries.34 The language employed **is a powerful shaping force**, and that force, in this context, is tied to the **discourse of consumption.** Baudrillard says that "consumption is the virtual totality of all objects and messages constituted in a more or less coherent discourse. Consumption, in so far as it is meaningful, is a systematic act of the manipulation of signs [italics in original]."35 Signs, in the Saussurean linguistic sense, are composed of the totality of the signifier and the signified. The focus on the customer approach and information as commodity embodies a shift from primary attention on the signified to attention centered on the signifier. The signified is the content, concept, or idea; the signifier is an expression, a sound-image, or form. In other words, the transformation is one from substance to form.

In another sense, the transformation **moves from semantics** (**meaning**) **to rhetoric** (**expression**). Emery writes that "'Without consumers, the marketer of economic goods and services does not have a market.' Similarly, without readers the library lacks its raison d'etre. Though in one case an individual may be called a 'consumer' and in the other a 'reader,' the difference is purely semantic."36 In actuality, Emery is dismissing the semantic and championing the rhetorical. In the more thoughtful connections of library purpose to capital, a kind of schizophrenia reigns. The schizoid tendency is evident in the conflict that Repo struggles with. Although he advocates economic analysis of information, he repeatedly reminds the reader (and himself) of the use value of information ("The value of information is fully explicated in its use."37) In less thoughtful treatments certainty governs. For example, in urging the customer approach, Weingand advocates the "paradigm" of consumerism as superior to the view of the library as a public good (noted above). **It seems to matter little that the language adopted is a usurpation of ideas** that either **do not apply** or **apply imperfectly to the** library's **situation.**

Weingand's statement is **not value neutral**. In fact, it is an exemplar of the Foucauldian will to truth and knowledge which, as Foucault observes, "**like the other systems of exclusion**, relies on institutional support: it is both reinforced and accompanied by whole strata of practices," and is "profoundly accompanied by the manner in which knowledge is employed in a society, the way it is exploited, divided and, in some ways, attributed. . . . [T]his will to knowledge, thus reliant upon institutional support and distribution, tends to exercise a sort of pres-sure, a power of constraint upon other **forms of discourse**."38 **The impact on knowledge is profound and debilitating**. The effect is best expressed by Lyotard:

The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of general transformation. . . . The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and will increasingly tend, to **assume the form** already taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume—that is, the form of value. Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. **Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself**, **it loses its "use-value."**39

Finally, the discourse on customer and commodity in the academic library **takes on the characteristics of ideology.** Specifi-cally, it is ideological in that **it asserts a dominance over other discourses**, and does so **through distortion of context** that **all but eliminates** any teleological sense. As Hawkes points out, two aspects of ideology —"instinctive deferral to 'the facts' as they are immediately represented to us, and blind faith in instrumental science —are the most dangerous effects of commodity fetishism. In order for a thing to become a commodity, the coercive power of human reason must be exerted over the thing-in-itself: we must represent it as what it is not, and then take the representations for the reality."40 Ultimately, librarians need to take care with the language they adopt, and with the facility with which they use it to shape concepts. That the language **of consumerism and commodification** dominates beyond the sphere of libraries is **not sufficient reason to accept it uncritically**. The library's language, and practice, should flow from as clear an idea of purpose as possible. And librarians should examine purpose independently from the pressures of capitalism and consumption.

**Two - Role of Ballot and Alt solves – critiquing and excising neoliberal terminology is valuable. It’s an important framework question - spills to better scholarship and awareness,**

**Bal ‘18**

et al; P. Matthijs Bal – Professor, Lincoln International Business School University of Lincoln – “Neoliberal Ideology in Work and Organizational Psychology” - Manuscript accepted for publication in European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology - #E&F – available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/151432027.pdf>

We postulate a number of implications and recommendations for future research. First, it is important that within the field of WOP, researchers become more aware of the underlying (ideological) assumptions driving their research. **Discourse analysis could be informative** in further elucidating the ideological underpinnings of our research and how researchers **justify their research** in **neoliberal terminology** (e.g., instrumentality, business case). Only through explicit awareness and acknowledgement of fundamental assumptions of research, these can be **debated,** defended **or changed**. As 'objective' research concerns an impossibility in a social science (Greenwood & Van Buren III, 2017), research is by definition driven by interpretations of what is happening in the workplace, and ideological choices regarding what type of constructs are studied, what theories and models are designed, and how outcomes are legitimized. We advocate pluralism in relation to our field, where we can openly debate the basic **assumptions underlying our research** (i.e., why and for whom we are conducting our research) and how we can create more pluralism in the actual research that we do (i.e., the topics, methods, techniques and analyses). This may also help researchers to make more explicit choices regarding what can be regarded as important in the context of WOP to study 1.